On The Relation Between Outdated Docker Containers, Severity
  Vulnerabilities and Bugs by Zerouali, Ahmed et al.
On The Relation Between Outdated Docker
Containers, Severity Vulnerabilities and Bugs
Ahmed Zerouali
ahmed.zerouali@umons.ac.be
University of Mons
Tom Mens
tom.mens@umons.ac.be
University of Mons
Gregorio Robles
grex@gsyc.urjc.es
Universidad Rey Juan Carlos
Jesus M. Gonzalez-Barahona
jgb@gsyc.es
Universidad Rey Juan Carlos
Abstract—Packaging software into containers is becoming a
common practice when deploying services in cloud and other
environments. Docker images are one of the most popular
container technologies for building and deploying containers.
A container image usually includes a collection of software
packages, that can have bugs and security vulnerabilities that
affect the container health. Our goal is to support container
deployers by analysing the relation between outdated containers
and vulnerable and buggy packages installed in them. We use
the concept of technical lag of a container as the difference
between a given container and the most up-to-date container that
is possible with the most recent releases of the same collection
of packages. For 7,380 official and community Docker images
that are based on the Debian Linux distribution, we identify
which software packages are installed in them and measure their
technical lag in terms of version updates, security vulnerabilities
and bugs. We have found, among others, that no release is devoid
of vulnerabilities, so deployers cannot avoid vulnerabilities even
if they deploy the most recent packages. We offer some lessons
learned for container developers in regard to the strategies they
can follow to minimize the number of vulnerabilities. We argue
that Docker container scan and security management tools should
improve their platforms by adding data about other kinds of bugs
and include the measurement of technical lag to offer deployers
information of when to update.
Index Terms—Empirical analysis, Docker containers, technical
lag, security vulnerability
I. INTRODUCTION
Packaging software into containers has become a common
practice during the last years [2]. In particular, Docker con-
tainers are a popular schema to provision multiple software
applications on a single host. A container is a running image,
which includes its own system libraries, configuration files,
and software [17], providing support for both Linux-based
and other operating systems [18], [23]. Docker allows for
the creation of registries, providing a common place to share
Docker images. With more than 1.6M images (October 2018),
Docker Hub [9] is one of the largest of such registries.
Images in Docker Hub are organized in repositories, each
one providing a set of versioned Docker images. Repositories
can be private or public, which in turn are split into official and
community repositories. An official repository contains public
and certified images from recognized vendors (e.g., Elastic-
Search, Debian, Alpine). Images in official repositories are
frequently used as the base for other Docker images, since they
are supposed to be secure and well maintained. Community
repositories can be created by any user or organization [4].
When Docker images are built with Linux-based operating
systems, they usually follow the packaging model for their
Linux distribution of choice, with most of the software they
include installed as a package. Once the image is built,
packages remain frozen (for a certain version of that image).
From time to time, a new version of the image is built, with a
newer version of the packages. But the old version may be still
in use, deployed as a container in production. Those containers
corresponding to old images may include outdated packages
with known security vulnerabilities and bugs, already fixed in
newer versions but still present in them. Since the containers
may run in production, they could be exposed to exploits of
those vulnerabilities, and problems due to those bugs.
On the other hand, deployers of containers may prefer to
stick to old versions, because they are known to work well
and have been tested in production for a long time. In fact, the
use of container images provides some isolation from evolving
dependencies and changes in packages that may break working
systems. This is a strong motivation to stick to an image
which “just works”, even if it is outdated, since upgrading
to new versions of container images always involves some
risk. Thus, deployers are always balancing their need to update
to new images –with fixed vulnerabilities and bugs– and the
risk of breaking a working system with the upgrade, due to
unexpected changes in the packages.
This compromise has been widely reported in literature.
According to a survey carried out in January 2015 by Red
Hat and Forrester [3], security is a top concern when deciding
whether to deploy containers. Another survey carried out by
DevOps.com and RedMonk in December 2016 [10] revealed
that users who are more concerned by image security focused
on scanning simple Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures
(CVE) on the operating system. In April 2017, Anchore.io
conducted a survey with 242 users on the current landscape
of practices being deployed by container users [1]. One of the
questions of that survey was: “Other than security, what are
the other checks that you perform before running application
containers?” The top answers related to software package
were: required packages (∼ 40% of the answers); presence of
bugs in major third-party software (∼ 33% of the answers);
and verifying whether third party software versions are up-to-
date (∼ 27% of the answers).
To support deployers of containers in this everyday com-
promise, we propose a method to assess on how outdated,
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vulnerable, and buggy Docker images are with respect to the
latest available releases of the packages they include.
The method is based on the concept of technical lag [13],
which we use to estimate the difference between the software
deployed in production and the most recent version of this
software (in our case, in terms of novelty, vulnerabilities
and bugs). To show the applicability of the approach, we
have conducted an empirical study, measuring technical lag,
security vulnerabilities and bugs for 2, 453 official and 4, 927
community Docker Hub images based on the Debian Linux
distribution. The research questions that we have addressed in
this study are:
RQ0: How often are Docker images updated?
RQ1: What is the technical lag induced by outdated packages
in containers?
RQ2: How vulnerable are packages in containers?
RQ3: To which extent do containers suffer from bugs in
packages?
RQ4: How long do bugs remain unfixed?
RQ5: How long do security vulnerabilities remain unfixed?
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: Section II
reviews some relevant related work; Section III outlines the
empirical methodology, including the datasets used, the se-
lection of the analyzed images, and the collection of data;
Section IV presents the results of the empirical analysis;
Section V highlights our contributions and main findings;
Section VI discusses the limitations of the study; and finally
Section VII outlines possible directions for future work, and
conclusions.
II. RELATED WORK
Gonza´lez-Barahona et al. [13] proposed a theoretical model
of “technical lag” to measure how outdated software compo-
nents are. They explored many ways in which technical lag
can be measured, and presented specific cases for which it is
useful to analyze the evolution of technical lag.
Kula et al. [14] studied the impact of dependency updates
in the GitHub ecosystem. They empirically studied library
migration of a set of 4,600 GitHub repositories and 2,700
library dependencies, and found that 81.5% of the studied
projects keep their outdated dependencies. Surveying devel-
opers about this, they found that 69% of the interviewees
were unaware of these outdated dependencies. Zerouali et
al. [25] introduced and analyzed a technical lag metric for
dependencies in package networks, in order to assess how
outdated a software package is compared to the latest available
releases of its dependencies. Considering JavaScript packages
as a case study, they found a strong presence of technical lag
caused by the specific use of dependency constraints. Decan
et al. [7] found similar results. Cox et al. [6] analyzed 75
software systems and introduced different metrics to quantify
their use of recent versions of dependencies. They found that
systems using outdated dependencies were four times more
likely to have security issues than up-to-date systems.
Focusing on Docker images, Cito et al. [5] conducted an em-
pirical study on a dataset of 70,000 Dockerfiles, and contrasted
this general population with samplings containing the top 100
and top 1,000 most popular projects using Docker. Their goal
was to characterize the Docker ecosystem, discover prevalent
quality issues, and study the evolution of Docker images.
Among other results, they found that the most popular projects
change more often than the rest of the Docker population,
with an average of 5.81 revisions per year and 5 lines of code
changed. Furthermore, they found that, from a representative
sample of 560 projects, 34% of all Docker images could not
be built.
Shu et al. [22] performed a generic large scale study on the
state of security vulnerabilities in both community and official
Docker Hub repositories. They proposed the Docker Image
Vulnerability Analysis (DIVA) framework to automatically
discover, download, and analyze Docker images for security
vulnerabilities. They studied a set of 356,218 images and
observed that both official and community repositories contain
on average more than 180 vulnerabilities; many images had
not been updated for hundreds of days, demonstrating a strong
need for more analysis and systematic methods of studying the
content of Docker containers.
In our work, we only consider unique images, since we
found many duplicate images inside the same repository.
Additionally, we study in more detail the relation between
package security vulnerabilities and technical lag of outdated
packages. Moreover, and to the best of our knowledge, we are
the first to study and report results about non-security-related
package bugs in Docker containers.
III. METHOD AND DATA EXTRACTION
Our study is based on pulling Docker images from Docker
Hub, identifying which packages are installed in them, and
computing the technical lag for the image by aggregating the
technical lag of those packages. We will measure the tech-
nical lag of individual packages in terms of version updates,
vulnerabilities, and bugs. Our initial sample is composed of
all official images in Docker Hub which are based on Debian,
and the most pulled images based on Debian. Therefore, we
only need to compute technical lag for Debian packages.
The overall process, which we describe in detail below,
is: (1) identification of Docker Hub base images for Debian,
defining our base set; (2) identification of Docker Hub images
in our dataset, including those derived from the base set; (3)
analysis of all those images, matching their packages to a
historical archive of all Debian packages; and (4) identification
of bug and vulnerability reports for those packages, based on
a historical database with those details for Debian packages.
Figure 1 shows how we used the main data sources for our
study. The next subsections explain in detail how we gathered
the used datasets.
A replication package for our study is available for down-
load at https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.1250314.
A. Base images for Debian
We decided to work with Docker images based on a Linux-
distribution, because applications in them are usually installed
Data Extraction
Container
images
Package
information
Bug
reports
Vulnerability
reports
Analysis
Fig. 1. Process of the Docker container package analysis.
using well-defined packages. Among them, we selected De-
bian because of its maturity and widespread use1 in Docker
Hub. On October 1st 2018, the Debian repository on Docker
Hub had more than 125M pulls2.
While it is possible to create Docker images from scratch,
most of them are based on others, which in the end are built on
base images that do not rely on any other image, except for the
Docker-reserved minimal image named “scratch”3. Since we
want to deal with images based in Debian, we first identified
Debian base images4.
The Debian project maintains packages for several simul-
taneous release lines (Debian distributions) [12]. The most
important distributions are Testing, Stable and Oldstable. In
Testing, packages are updated frequently, when new releases
have been inspected and validated (e.g., lack of critical bugs,
successful compilation, etc). At some points in time, when
Testing as a whole reaches a certain level of quality and
stability, it is “frozen”, and their packages used to produce
a new Stable distribution. Upon release of a Stable version,
the former one becomes Oldstable, which in turn becomes
Oldoldstable. While updates in Testing usually come with new
functionality, updates in Stable and Oldstable include only the
most important fixes or security updates. Currently, there is
no security support for Oldoldstable and older distributions.
Thus, we chose to analyze Docker Hub Debian base images
only for Testing, Stable and Oldstable. Table I shows general
information about the Debian versions considered for this
work.
TABLE I
GENERAL INFORMATION ABOUT THE ANALYZED Debian VERSIONS.
Version name Version Distribution Release date as stable
Buster Debian 10 Testing -
Stretch Debian 9 Stable 2017-06-17
Jessie Debian 8 Oldstable 2013-04-25
B. Identifying analyzed images
Images in Docker Hub are named with the name of the
repository, followed by a colon, and a tag (“imageRepo:Tag”).
Any image can be tagged more than once, and there-
fore may have more than one name (e.g., “debian:testing”,
1https://www.ctl.io/developers/blog/post/docker-hub-top-10/
2https://registry.hub.docker.com/v2/repositories/library/debian/
3https://docs.docker.com/develop/developimages/baseimages/
4https://hub.docker.com/ /debian/
“debian:testing-20181011”). In the case of community im-
ages, the name of the repository usually starts with the
name of the organization producing the images: “organiza-
tionName/ImageName”. Therefore, full image names tend to
have the form “organizationName/ImageName:Tag”.
Each image is composed of one or many intermediate
images called layers. Each layer is related to a change
caused by commands that happened in the Dockerfile5 used
to produce the image, and has a unique hash signature. For
example, the Dockerfile of the debian:stretch image is:
FROM scratch
ADD rootfs.tar.xz /
CMD ["bash"]
When building the image with this Dockerfile, a single layer
is produced:
debian:stretch Layers: [
"sha256:e1df5dc88d2cc2cd9a1b1680ec3cb" ]
This image, in turn, can be used in other Dockerfiles as
their base image using “FROM debian:stretch”. Each image
produced from those Dockerfiles will contain the layer(s)
of the base image. For example, debian:stretch-backports is
produced with this Dockerfile:
FROM debian:stretch
RUN echo ’deb http://deb.debian.org/debian
stretch-backports main’
> /etc/apt/sources.list.d/backports.list
The resulting debian:stretch-backports image includes the
layer found in debian:stretch, its base image:
debian:stretch-backports Layers: [
"sha256:e1df5dc88d2cc2cd9a1b1680ec3cb",
"sha256:4c1b8d4c6076530dcd195cbc309e5" ]
Therefore, we can identify Docker images derived from
Debian base images by checking if they contain their layers.
Using the Docker Hub API we extracted all available image
names from the 124 official repositories, and those with at
least 500 pulls from the top 30,000 community repositories (by
number of pulls). Using the skopeo tool6 we inspected images
corresponding to all those image names, identifying unique
images, and finding which ones included layers from our set
of Debian base images. From 14,653 image names in official
repositories, we found 2,453 unique images (i.e., 4,769 names)
based on our set of Debian images. From 30,000 community
repositories, we found 4,927 unique images derived form our
Debian set. All of them together composed our dataset of 7380
images. Table II shows the number of images found for each
Debian version.
C. Identifying installed packages
Docker containers based in Debian include specific versions
of Debian binary packages. Binary packages are produced
5https://docs.docker.com/engine/reference/builder/
6skopeo is a utility to inspect a repository on a Docker registry: https:
//github.com/containers/skopeo
TABLE II
NUMBER OF Docker IMAGES PER Debian DISTRIBUTION.
Containers Buster / Testing Stretch / Stable Jessie / Oldstable
Official 150 620 1,683
Community 86 1,248 3,593
Total 236 1,868 5,276
from source packages, which we need to identify because we
use them to find vulnerabilities and bug reports.
For tracking binary packages, and finding their metadata
(including the name and version of the source package from
which they were produced), we extracted daily snapshots of all
amd64 binary packages for Oldstable (Jessie), Stable (Stretch)
and Testing (Buster) distributions from the official and security
Debian Snapshot repositories7.
Then, we pulled each Docker image in our images
dataset, and identified its packages using regular Debian tools
(dpkg -l). We matched them to our dataset obtained from
Debian Snapshot, finding in it more than 99% of the packages
in our images (1,379,163 package versions in official images,
and 561,982 in community images).
D. Vulnerability reports
To find out known security vulnerabilities for the Debian
packages in our dataset of Docker images, we used the Debian
Security Bug Tracker8 as of 2018-03-18. For each package, the
status of known vulnerabilities is maintained by the Debian
Security Team, using data from different data sources (CVE
database9, National Vulnerability Database ”NVD”10, etc).
In this Debian tracker, information about vulnerabilities
is maintained at the source package level. A Debian vul-
nerability report contains information about affected source
packages, severity, status, Debian bug id (if available), affected
distributions, fixed version (if available), etc. Using it we
can link vulnerabilities to source packages, and from there
(using the Debian Snapshot dataset) to binary packages in our
container images of interest. For each reported vulnerability
for a package present in one of the analyzed images, we say
that the corresponding package version is vulnerable if the
vulnerability is still open, or the vulnerability has been fixed
in a more recent version than the one installed in the image.
E. Bug reports
For bug reports, we used the Ultimate Debian Database11,
querying for known bugs for the packages installed in our
container images. UDD is a continuously updated system that
gathers various Debian data in the same SQL database [19]:
bugs, packages, upload history, maintainers, etc.
UDD contains information about all bug reports, including
those that were archived. To identify if a package version is
7http://snapshot.debian.org/archive/debian/ and
http://snapshot.debian.org/archive/debian-security/
8https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/data/json
9https://cve.mitre.org/cve/
10https://nvd.nist.gov
11https://udd.debian.org/bugs/
“buggy”, we queried UDD for all bug reports for that package.
For each reported bug we checked if the specific package
version was higher or equal to the version where the bug was
first found. In case the bug report is resolved, we also verified
if the package version is lower than the one fixing the bug.
IV. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS RESULTS
RQ0: How often are Docker images updated?
In order to analyze the technical lag of Docker container
packages, it is essential to know how often Docker maintainers
update their images and when they were last updated. This
allows us to have a better understanding and carry out a fair
comparison between the content of the different containers.
In September 2017, Anchore.io analyzed the official Docker
images update history12 and found that operating system
images like Debian, Alpine or Ubuntu update less often than
non-OS images like Redis, MySQL or Postgres. They also
noticed that Debian images are updated every month, which
is the average compared to other OS images. Moreover, they
observed that on some days many repositories push updates
at the same time. Investigating this phenomenon, they found
that in many cases this occurs the day after their base image
debian:latest was updated.
Figure 2 shows the years when the considered Docker
images were last updated. We observe that the number of
official images that were updated in 2018 is less than those
that were updated in 2017, for the images that make use of the
Oldstable version Jessie (Debian 8), while it is the opposite
for the community images. Another important observation that
should be taken into account for the rest of the study is
that 48% of the community images and 66% of the official
images were last updated before 2018. This can be explained
by the number of images per repository: while official repos-
itories have many images with different operating systems
(i.e., including slim and full) and for different architectures,
community repositories have predominantly only one unique
image (latest) with different tags. Thus, in official repositories
new images emerge while others stop being updated; and
community repositories tend to keep updating their images
without creating new ones.
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Fig. 2. Year of Docker images last update, grouped by Debian distribution
and community type (community or official)
Findings for RQ0: More than half of the Docker images
have not been updated for four months.
12https://anchore.com/blog/look-often-docker-images-updated/
RQ1: What is the technical lag induced by outdated packages
in containers?
RQ1 investigates how outdated the packages in Docker
containers are, based on a quantification of their technical
lag. Therefore, first we start by exploring how many pack-
ages within containers are up-to-date (i.e., having the latest
available fix). Figure 3 shows the proportion of up-to-date
and outdated packages in both official and community Docker
containers, grouped by their Debian version. We observe that,
regardless of the Debian version, most packages are up-
to-date. The median proportion of up-to-date packages per
container is 82% of all installed packages. We also notice that
packages inside community containers are slightly more up-
to-date (median 85%) than packages inside official containers
(median 78%) .
We statistically verified our observation by carrying out
a non-parametric Mann-Whitney U test that does not as-
sume normality of the data. The null hypothesis assumes
that the up-to-date package distributions of the community
and official containers, grouped by their Debian version, are
identical. For each pair of groups (Official-Jessie, Community-
Jessie), (Official-Stretch, Community-Stretch), and (Official-
Buster, Community-Buster), we rejected H0 with statistical sig-
nificance (p < 0.01) when comparing the up-to-date package
distributions of two groups of containers. However, for each
comparison, we only found a small effect size (|d| ≤ 0.28)
using Cliff’s Delta, a non-parametric measure quantifying the
difference between two groups of observations.
When restricting our analysis to recent images only (i.e.,
those that were last updated in 2018), we found that packages
in official containers are slightly more up-to-date than pack-
ages in community containers. Since community images are
based on official images, this means that from all available
official images, Docker community deployers tend to use
the most recently updated ones, or they manually update
all outdated packages inherited from old official images. We
also found that the median proportion of up-to-date packages
per container, in all cases, increased to 98% of all installed
packages.
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Fig. 3. Proportion of up-to-date and outdated packages in Docker containers.
Once we have identified the outdated packages, we can
calculate their technical lag.
We define technical lag as the difference between the used
package version and the latest available version. Since Debian
maintainers are supporting three releases (Jessie, Stretch and
Buster), we measure the technical lag in terms of the number
of versions available between the used and the latest available
version from the same Debian release. For instance, suppose
that a used package q of container c has the following series of
version numbers in Debian 8 Jessie (1.0.0, 1.1.1, 1.1.2, 1.1.4)
and in Debian 9 Stretch (2.0.0, 2.1.1). If we find that the used
version of package q is 1.1.1, then we compare it to the latest
version of the available releases in Debian 8 Jessie, which is
1.1.4. The version lag in this case would be 2 versions, namely
1.1.2 and 1.1.4.
For all containers, we measured the technical lag of their
outdated packages. Figure 4 shows the technical lag in terms
of versions for the outdated packages in Docker containers,
grouped by their Debian version. At first sight, we observe that
the distributions are highly skewed. However, the distribution
for the containers using Debian Stretch is more highly skewed
than the others. Table III shows that the median version lag for
both Jessie and Stretch containers is 1, while it is 2 versions
for Buster. This small difference is related to the state of
the Debian release. Because the Buster version is now in the
Testing phase, many containers prefer not to depend on its
packages since they are still subject to many changes, making
it hard to keep up with its updating process. However, we can
conclude that, in general, packages in Docker containers are
either up-to-date or lagging behind with a median of 1 to 2
versions.
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Fig. 4. Version lag induced by outdated packages in Docker containers.
TABLE III
MEAN AND MEDIAN OF OUTDATED PACKAGE VERSION LAG GROUPED BY
Debian VERSION AND CONTAINER TYPE.
Containers Official Communitymean median mean median
Jessie 2.13 1 1.93 1
Stretch 1.36 1 1.24 1
Buster 2.71 2 3.05 2
Since we found that the proportion of up-to-date installed
packages per container is high, we decided to investigate more
about the used package versions and when they were created.
Considering only the up-to-date package versions this time, we
traced back the date when they were first seen in Debian. We
found that most of the package versions are old. Moreover, we
found that exactly 80% of the used Stretch package versions
and 90% of the Jessie package versions were created before
2017-06-18, the release date of the Stable version of Stretch.
We also found that 63% of the used Jessie package versions
were created before the release date of the Stable version of
Jessie (i.e., 2015-04-25). This means that used packages tend
to remain up-to-date because of the way in which Debian
maintainers are creating and updating their packages.
Findings for RQ1:· One out of five installed packages in containers is outdated.· Users of community containers tend to use recently
updated official images.· Outdated installed packages are lagging behind one to two
versions.
RQ2: How vulnerable are packages in containers?
Verifying a software system for presence of security vul-
nerabilities is important. A vulnerability is a fault that could
be exploited to abuse the system. With RQ2, we analyze
the vulnerability of Docker containers and if the observed
vulnerability is related to the presence of outdated packages
in the containers.
We have therefore identified all vulnerable packages: only
12.2% (i.e., 488 out of 3,975) of all unique installed packages
(from both official and community containers) had security
issues. Figure 5 shows the distribution of vulnerabilities by
their severity (not assigned, unimportant, low, medium or high)
and status (open, resolved and undetermined). We found that
49.9% (i.e., 12,806) of all vulnerabilities are resolved, while
48.6% (i.e., 12,479) are still open. A small proportion of 1.6%
(i.e., 401) are undetermined. We also observe that the majority
of vulnerabilities has a medium (37.2%), unimportant (20.2%)
or high (18.3%) severity. However, we found that all containers
are affected by these severity vulnerabilities. In fact, 96%
of all containers are affected by all types of vulnerabilities,
except for the not assigned vulnerabilities. This possibly
means that this small proportion of 12.2% of packages cause
the vulnerability of nearly all Docker containers.
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Fig. 5. Proportion of found vulnerabilities grouped by their severity and
status.
Next, we computed the number of vulnerabilities per con-
tainer. We obtained a mean number of 1,336.44 vulnerabilities
and a median of 601. The big difference between mean and
median signals a heavily skewed distribution. Indeed, the max-
imum is 7,338 vulnerabilities for one container. Using a Mann-
Whitney U test we found statistically significant differences
(p < 0.01) in the number of vulnerabilities per container
between official and community distributions. However, the
effect size was small (|d| < 0.3). Table IV shows more
details about the distribution of the number of vulnerabilities
in Docker containers.
TABLE IV
MINIMUM, MEDIAN AND MAXIMUM NUMBER OF VULNERABILITIES PER
CONTAINER, GROUPED BY Debian VERSION AND CONTAINER TYPE.
Containers
Debian
Official Community
min median max min median max
Jessie 155 658 7,106 155 916 7,338
Stretch 85 242 3,498 75 336 4,729
Buster 34 134 659 41 183 1,035
To study the relation between the outdated container pack-
ages and the vulnerability of the container, we compared the
number of outdated packages and number of vulnerabilities per
container. Considering both official and community containers,
and without differentiating between vulnerabilities by severity
or status, we plot the numbers in a scatter plot for different
Debian versions (Figure 6). We visually observe a certain
relationship between both metrics, especially for the Jessie
containers: when the number of outdated packages increases,
the number of vulnerabilities tends to increase as well.
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Fig. 6. Number of outdated packages and vulnerabilities per container.
To verify our observations, we calculated Pearson’s correla-
tion coefficient R and Spearman’s ρ over all packages, using
the following threshold values : 0 < |very weak| ≤ 0.2 <
|weak| ≤ 0.4 < |moderate| ≤ 0.6 < |moderately strong| ≤
0.8 < |strong| ≤ 1. A moderately strong increasing correla-
tion (0.6 < R ≤ 0.8 and 0.6 < ρ ≤ 0.8) for Jessie and Buster,
and only a moderate one for Stretch (R = 0.53 and ρ = 0.42)
exists.
Table V shows the top 10 vulnerable official and community
images. Their number of vulnerabilities and their age in
months are given in parentheses. For the official images,
only the top vulnerable image in a repository is presented.
For example, the perl repository has many images with a
high number of vulnerabilities; summed together, perl would
be in the top 10. However, since these images provide the
same functionality, we report only one: the most vulnerable
image. A common characteristic about the top 10 vulnerable
containers for both types is that they have not been updated
lately. They are between 10.7 months and three years old.
Table VI shows the top 10 most and least vulnerable source
packages, with their number of vulnerabilities (in parentheses)
and the proportion of containers that make use of them.
The three most vulnerable source packages linux, chromium-
browser and imagemagick seem to have high number of binary
packages: 433, 419 and 327, respectively. We verified if there
is a relation between the number of binary packages and the
number of vulnerabilities, but we could not find a significant
one. For instance, the source packages mono and libreoffice
have 241 and 195 binary packages, but they have only 1 and
9 vulnerabilities, respectively.
TABLE V
TOP 10 VULNERABLE OFFICIAL AND COMMUNITY Docker IMAGES. AGE IS
GIVEN IN MONTHS.
Official images
(#vulnerabilities, age)
Community images
(#vulnerabilities, age)
perl:5.12.5-threaded
(7106, 36.0)
weboaks/chromium-xvfb-node
(7338, 27.8)
node:0.8.28
(6889, 32.9)
jmoifutu/almakioski-processor-base
(7282, 35.2)
erlang:18.2.1
(6713, 28.4)
suitupalex/node-composer
(7167, 26.2)
ruby:2.1.8
(6426, 25.9)
youdowell/php-fpm-for-wordpress
(7155, 25.5)
sentry:7.5.0
(5742, 35.9)
newsdev/github-keys
(7106, 35.5)
pypy:2-2.5.1
(5742, 36.0)
jmvrbanac/hastebin
(7106, 35.9)
python:2.7.9
(5742, 36.2)
devdetonator/protractor
(7106, 35.7)
gcc:6.1.0
(5288, 20.5)
kosmtik/kosmtik
(7106, 35.7)
hylang:0.12.1
(3847, 11.1)
misterbisson/couchbase-cloud-benchmark
(7106, 35.7)
elixir:1.4.4
(3843, 10.7)
pelle/ruby-phantomjs
(7013, 35.6)
TABLE VI
TOP 10 OF MOST AND LEAST VULNERABLE Debian SOURCE PACKAGES.
Most vulnerable
source package
(# vulnerabilities)
Used by
Least vulnerable
source package
(# vulnerabilities)
Used by
linux (433) 54.51% audit (1) 100.0%
chromium-browser
(419)
0.43% bzip2 (1) 100.0%
imagemagick (327) 28.13% db5.3 (1) 100.0%
php5 (186) 2.3% pam (1) 100.0%
firefox-esr (139) 0.09% sensible-utils (1) 98.97%
openjdk-7 (136) 3.69% libffi (1) 94.13%
tcpdump (132) 0.19% cyrus-sasl2 (1) 88.79%
binutils (124) 53.55% libssh2 (1) 82.64%
qemu (117) 0.22% cryptsetup (1) 73.43%
mysql-5.5 (103) 26.82% libbsd (1) 72.8%
Findings for RQ2:· Nearly half of the vulnerabilities have no fix.· All containers have high severity vulnerabilities.· The number of vulnerabilities depends on the Debian
release used.· The number of vulnerabilities is moderately correlated
with the number of outdated packages in a container.
RQ3: To which extent do containers suffer from bugs in
packages?
RQ3 studies the presence of non-security-related bugs in
Docker container packages, and the relation between bugs
and outdated packages. Considering all packages for both
community and official images, we found that 50.1% (1,994 out
of 3,975) of all unique installed source packages have bugs.
We also discovered that all containers have “buggy” packages.
Figure 7 shows the distribution of bugs grouped by sta-
tus (pending, forwarded, fixed) and severity (wishlist, minor,
normal, important, high). The high category combined three
different severity types: serious, grave and critical. We found
that 65.5% (12,863) of all bugs are still pending, 7.3% (3,460)
are forwarded and only 27.2% (30,922) are fixed. With respect
to the severity, only 2.9% of all bugs are high, 27.7% are
important, 50.2% are normal and the rest is minor or still in
the wishlist.
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Fig. 7. Proportion of bugs grouped by severity and status.
Since the majority of bugs are still pending –nearly two out
of three package bugs (65.5%) are without a fix, and one out
of two packages (i.e., 50.1%) has a bug– we would expect the
number of bugs per container to be higher than the number of
vulnerabilities.
We found that the mean and median numbers of bugs per
container (including both official and community) are 2,081
and 2,163 respectively. When comparing number of bugs in
official and community containers, we obtained a statistically
significant difference with p < 0.01 using the Mann-Whitney
U test. However, a small effect size (|d| < 0.2) for the Buster
and Stretch versions, and a medium effect size (|d| = 0.28)
for the Jessie version exist. The number of reported bugs
decreases with more recent versions of Debian. Table VII
shows details about the distribution of the number of bugs
in Docker containers.
TABLE VII
MIN, MEDIAN AND MAX OF BUGS PER CONTAINER GROUPED BY Debian
VERSION AND CONTAINER TYPE.
Containers
Debian
Official Community
min median max min median max
Jessie 1,307 2,201 3,415 1,296 2,450 5,628
Stretch 962 1,683 2,665 828 1,759 3,285
Buster 213 560 776 278 561 1,098
We also studied the relation between the presence of
outdated packages and bugs in containers. Considering both
official and community containers, and without differentiating
between bug status or severity, Figure 8 shows a scatter
plot, for different Debian versions, of the relation between
the number of outdated packages and the number of bugs
found in each container. Opposite to what we observed for
vulnerabilities in RQ2 (Figure 6), there is only a relation
between the number of bugs and number of outdated packages
for the Buster version.
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Fig. 8. Number of outdated packages and bugs per container.
To statistically verify our observations, we computed Pear-
son’s R and Spearman’s ρ correlation coefficients for all
packages. For Jessie and Stretch, the correlation was weak
to very weak (R ≤ 0.2 and ρ ≤ 0.22). For Buster, a moderate
increasing correlation (R = 0.58 and ρ = 0.55) was observed.
This is because Buster contains many new package versions,
which still get new bug notifications. Jessie and Stretch, on the
other hand, contain mainly stable and old package versions,
that mainly contain old bugs. Indeed, 90% of Jessie bugs
were created before July 2016, and 78% of Stretch bugs were
created before its Stable release in June 2017.
Findings for RQ3:· All containers have buggy packages.· 65% of bugs in installed packages are without a fix.· The number of bugs is related to the Debian version used.· There is a weak correlation between the number of bugs
and the number of outdated packages in containers relying
on the Stable and Oldstable Debian release.
RQ4: How long do bugs remain unfixed?
Since nearly half of all vulnerabilities are still open and 65%
of all bugs are still pending, RQ4 investigates how long it takes
for a bug to get fixed. To do so, for all bugs, we compute the
time interval between the bug report creation date in the UDD
and the last modification date of the bug, considering that this
corresponds to the bug fix date, in case a fix was observed.
We rely on the statistical technique of survival analysis
based on the non-parametric Kaplan-Meier statistic estimator
commonly used to estimate survival functions [11] (widely
used before in software engineering research [16], [20], [21]).
Figure 9 shows survival curves per severity level for the event
“bug is fixed” w.r.t. the bug report creation date. We observe
that the time to fix a bug does not always depend on its severity
level. High severity bugs are fixed faster than other kind of
bugs. For example, it takes 53.8 and 33.5 months so that 50%
of all normal and minor bugs get fixed, respectively, while it
only takes 3 months for high severity bugs. Debian maintainers
prefer to start with easy bugs that are trivial to fix rather than
normal ones. Nonetheless, bugs that may have an impact on
releasing the package with the Stable release of Debian (i.e.,
high severity13) have the highest priority.
To find out if there are statistically significant differences
between the survival curves per severity, we carried out
log-rank tests for each severity pair. The differences were
statistically confirmed (p < 0.01 after Bonferroni correction)
except for the pairs (normal, important) and (minor, wishlist)
where the null hypothesis could not be rejected.
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Fig. 9. Survival probability for event “bug is fixed” w.r.t. the bug report
creation date.
Findings for RQ4:· Normal and minor bugs require in the median very long
times to be fixed (53.8 and 33.5 months).· High severity bugs are fixed ten times faster than other
kind of bugs.
RQ5: How long do security vulnerabilities remain unfixed?
Similar to the bug survival analysis, we analyzed the sur-
vival of security vulnerabilities over time. Using the Debian
security tracker we extracted the debianbug id for each vulner-
ability. With this id, we searched in the UDD for the creation
and last modification date of the corresponding bug. We only
found 62% of all vulnerabilities with a corresponding debian-
bug id. This proportion of vulnerabilities is responsible for
93% of all container vulnerabilities. For this subset we carried
out a survival analysis for the event “security vulnerability is
fixed” w.r.t. the bug report creation date. Figure 10 shows the
Kaplan-Meier survival curves for each severity level found
on the security tracker (as opposed to the severity of the bug
reported in the UDD).
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Fig. 10. Survival probability per severity level for event ”security vulnerability
is fixed” w.r.t. the date of the bug arrival.
13https://www.debian.org/Bugs/Developer.en.html#severities
We observe that vulnerabilities are fixed faster than other
types of bugs. It takes 5.9 months for not assigned severity
vulnerabilities, 2.4 months for medium severity vulnerabilities,
and 2.1 months for high severity vulnerabilities. Low severity
vulnerabilities take much more time to fix: 27 months to
fix 50% of them. We could not include the unimportant
vulnerabilities since only 0.5% of them are fixed. We carried
out log-rank tests to compare whether there are statistically
significant differences between the survival curves depending
on the severity of the bug. We could reject the null hypothesis
assuming the similarity between the survival analysis curves
with statistical significance (p < 0.01 after Bonferroni correc-
tion), except for high and medium severity vulnerabilities.
The findings concerning the unimportant vulnerabilities
could be understandable since those vulnerabilities do not
affect the binary package, but only materials and files that are
not built (e.g., doc/foo/examples/14). To investigate this further,
we identified the bug severity of the low severity vulnerabilities
inside the Debian bug tracker (i.e., from the UDD), and
found that 77.5% of these vulnerabilities have an important
or normal bug severity. This correlates with the findings in
RQ4 and explains the results for the low vulnerabilities.
However, we also observed that 51% of the high severity
vulnerabilities are labeled as important bugs and 45% of them
are considered as high (i.e., serious, grave or critical) bugs.
This means that an upstream high vulnerable package can have
a different priority downstream, depending on the downstream
maintainers assessment (i.e., how a package is compiled, how
it is integrated into the distribution, etc.).
Findings for RQ5:· High and medium severity vulnerabilities are fixed faster
than low severity vulnerabilities.· Vulnerability reports upstream might have different sever-
ity downstream.
V. DISCUSSION AND ACTIONABLE RESULTS
In an ideal world, containers should depend on the most
recent available version of their used packages, in order to
benefit from the latest functionality, security updates and bug
fixes. However, maintainers might be more focused on other
software characteristics such as package stability, or they
just choose not to upgrade certain packages because of the
considerable effort that may be involved in doing so (“if it ain’t
broke, don’t fix it”). For this reason, we studied the presence
of technical lag in Docker containers, and related it to the
presence of bugs and severity vulnerabilities.
In RQ1, we found that, in general, Debian packages used
in stable releases are old and up-to-date (i.e., having the latest
available fix). This implies that it should be easy for developers
to keep up with the Debian updating process, since package
maintainers are not releasing often. Moreover, new package
versions in the Stable and Oldstable releases are only about
security patches, so there is little to fear of breaking changes.
14https://security-team.debian.org/security tracker.html
For the Testing release, however, things are different: deployers
should be aware about how the Debian project works.
Actionable result: Container deployers should be aware
that the optimal update frequency of their base images and
installed packages depends on the base Debian version.
In RQ2, we found that the number of vulnerabilities is
related to the number of outdated packages per Debian-based
container. This demonstrates that containers could benefit from
better updating procedures, allowing them to avoid security
issues coming from their installed packages. Moreover, we
found that the number of vulnerabilities is related to the
Debian release.
Actionable result: Deployers who prefer stability to new
functionalities are recommended to use the Stable and
Oldstable versions that include only the most important
corrections or security updates. To have a lower number
of severe vulnerabilities, container deployers using the Old-
stable Debian release should upgrade to the Stable release.
In RQ3, we found that all Docker containers are vulnerable
and contain packages with a high number of vulnerabilities
and bugs. Since we did not discover a high version lag
in containers, we do not think it is the responsibility of
Docker deployers to avoid all vulnerabilities. Even containers
with up-to-date packages still may have a high number of
vulnerabilities.
Lesson learned: No release is devoid of vulnerabilities, so
deployers cannot avoid them even if they deploy the most
recent packages.
We could not find a significant relation between the number
of outdated packages and the number of bugs. However, we
observed that the number of bugs is related primarily to the
Debian release. This means that deployers that care about bugs
and new functionality and not about stability, should definitely
upgrade to the Debian Testing release, since the updates in
Stable and Oldstable releases are primarily about security bugs
(i.e., severity vulnerabilities).
Actionable result: Container deployers concerned with
having as few non-security bugs as possible should upgrade
to the Testing release, at the expense of having a lower
package stability.
Based on a survival analysis, we concluded that security
vulnerabilities take less time to fix than other kind of bugs. The
relation between vulnerabilities, bugs and outdated packages
shows that container deployers should give a high priority to
updating when checking their container packages.
Actionable result: High security bugs are first priority
for Debian maintainers; they are fixed faster than other
kind of bugs. Container deployers should be aware of the
newly available versions of their installed packages and keep
technical lag to the minimum to avoid this type of bugs.
Comparing our results about vulnerabilities to previous
observations [22], we found Debian-based Docker containers
to have an average number of vulnerabilities (i.e., 460) that
is above the average for all Docker containers (i.e., 120).
However, the number of vulnerabilities depends on the number
of installed packages found. For example, it is not fair to com-
pare vulnerabilities between Debian containers and Alpine15
containers, unless we compare their size as well (in terms of
number of installed packages).
As highlighted before, it is important to verify not only
vulnerabilities, but also other bugs. Indeed, bugs make the
system behave in unexpected ways, resulting in faults, wrong
functionality or reduced performance. Researchers already
found that performance bugs are similar to security bugs, in
that they require more experienced developers to fix them [24].
Hence, it is essential to include bug analysis tools into existing
automated scan and security management services such as
Anchore.io or Quay.io.
Moreover, an Anchore.io survey showed that container de-
ployers care more about package vulnerabilities than having
packages up-to-date. However, we found that less outdated
containers have less vulnerabilities. Thus, we believe that
including the technical lag as a measure of how outdated
packages are, can empower automated scan and security
management tools to give better insights about the security
of Docker containers.
Actionable result: Docker scan and security management
tools should improve their platforms by adding data about
other kind of bugs and include the measurement of technical
lag to offer deployers information of when to update.
Using our method, and more specifically our automated
data extraction tool, container deployers can check the state of
their container Debian package vulnerabilities and bugs. They
can also compare with other containers that make use of the
Debian operating system.
VI. THREATS TO VALIDITY
Our study was focused on Docker containers that make use
of the Testing, Stable or Oldstable versions of Debian. The
results of our analysis can therefore not be generalized to other
base images in Docker. The analysis itself, however, can be
easily replicated on other base images.
We chose to use the technical lag as a measurement. We
only compared the used package version with latest available
version of the package within the same Debian release. Our
results may differ when comparing with the latest available
package versions from the latest (e.g., Stable, Testing or
Unstable) Debian releases.
Moreover, it is not trivial to identify which package versions
are affected by bugs or severity vulnerabilities. For example,
the way in which we computed vulnerabilities and bugs
was different. For vulnerabilities we relied only on the fixed
version, since this is the way it is done in companies such as
CoreOS or Anchore.io. For bugs, we relied on two sources of
15Alpine is a minimal image based on the security-oriented, lightweight
Alpine Linux distribution with a complete package index that is no more than
8 Mb in size.
information: the bug report creation date and its last modifi-
cation date. Counting bugs in the same way as vulnerabilities
would result in more bugs than the ones considered in this
analysis.
Also, when searching for vulnerabilities in the Debian
security tracker, the debianbug id was not found for 38%
of the vulnerability reports. This may have influenced our
survival analysis results. However, the missing proportion of
vulnerability reports is responsible for only 7% of all analyzed
container vulnerabilities.
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
This paper presented an empirical analysis of the state of
packages in public Docker containers that are based on the
Linux-based Debian distribution. We studied how outdated
container packages are and how this relates to the presence
of bugs and severity vulnerabilities.
Considering both official and community images, we studied
7,380 popular unique images. We observed that most container
packages have the latest fix available in Debian, even for old
packages (e.g., Stable). However, we found that all containers
have vulnerable and buggy packages. Studying outdated pack-
ages in more detail, we found that their number is correlated
with the number of vulnerabilities found in a container.
We observed that in Debian, taking care of security vulnera-
bilities is more important than taking care of bugs. This results
a high number of open bugs for the Stable and Oldstable
releases. Therefore, even up-to-date installed package versions
could be affected by these open bugs.
These findings indicate that container deployers whose
major concerns are stability and security need to rely on better
updating procedures. In contrast, container deployers that care
more about functionality and bugs should rely on the newest
Debian releases.
When studying how outdated Docker images are, we did not
differentiate between specific package characteristics such as
their size, service, targeted audience, or provided functionality.
Moreover, we did not differentiate between release types (e.g.,
patch, minor or major) when calculating technical lag. In
future work we would like to consider other measures of
technical lag while considering package characteristics and all
available releases in a project. For instance, in many cases
vulnerability fixes are first done in the Testing or Unstable
releases before entering the Stable and Oldstable releases.
Besides the operating system packages, containers have
other types of packages installed on them, for instance, PyPI
and npm packages. Such packages can be vulnerable as
well [8], [15]. Thus, we aim to include these other types of
packages. We also plan to carry out a comparison with other
operating systems and other base images.
Since our data extraction and analysis are automated, we
aim to create a tool that automatically gathers and analyses
package information, such as package vulnerabilities, bugs,
possible updates, possible conflicts, dependencies, etc., for dif-
ferent operating systems. To be able to analyze their evolution,
we also aim to gather monthly snapshots about the Docker
containers content and state. Finally, we want to carry out
surveys and interviews with container deployers to validate
the implication of our work and collect more insights about
common practices.
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